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ASTRACT
This paper discusses several incentive models. Some
models are only appropriate for risk neutral agents, but not for
risk averse agents. For certain circumstances, a quadratic
model is needed to replace a linear model The choice of which
model is the appropriate one is the question addressed by this
paper. Risk attitude and several aspects of asymmetric
information will be discussed.
INTRODUCTION
The relationship between principals and agents commonly involves a situation
of asymmetrical information. Agents have more information about their own capacity
and the working environment than principals do. Assuming that individuals act to
maximize their own benefit, the presence of asymmetric information will motivate
agents to conceal any information unkwon to principals so far as it can promote the
agents' self-interest. This agency issue is known as hidden information and hidden
action problems.
In a participatory budget setting situation, the hidden information problem
suggests that the agents may not truthfully reveal his private information. In other
words, the agents create slack by setting an easy budget that is knowingly understate
their expected performance (Schiff and Lewin 1970). In paraticular, when the agents'
performance is evaluated on the basis of their budget targets, the agents will be
motivated to engage in this slack-creating activity. As Young et al. (1988, pp. 111-
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112) argued, "When a subordinate's pay increases as budget difficulty decreases,
ceteris paribus, he or she may bias the communication of private information such
that a relatively easy budget is set..." The tendecy of the agents to engage in this
slack-creating activities reduces the potential benefits of budget participation systems
as controlling and motivational devices. Budget targets do not 'trully' represent
employees' maximum efforts. Accordingly, principals' attempt to optimize the
organization's resources are inhibited.
Compensation schemes greatly affect the extent to which this slack-creating
problem can be mitigated. The principals' main task is, therefore, designing an
effective compensation scheme. At present, there are several compensation schemes
available in the literature. These compensation schemes, however, have very strict
assumptions which, quite often, do not reflect the real condition. Their applicability,
therefore, is very limited. For example, it is assumed that agents are risk-neutral but
empirical evidence demonstrated that some agents were risk averse (Chow et al.
1988; Waller 1988) Furthermore, it is (implicitly) assumed that agents' actions are
observable. In most cases, however, agents actions are unobservable.
This paper attempts to expand the applicability of the compensation models
by relaxing these two strict assumptions. In addition, it attempts to articulate
conditions which are appropriate for a certain compensation scheme. That is, the
paper also attempts to develop a contingency model of compensation schemes. It is
hoped that this paper will be able to help managers in designing appropriate incentive
schemes for their organization.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses a linear
incentive scheme, the Soviet models (Picard 1987; Kirby et al. 1991) Section 3
discusses the extended model with several assumptions relaxed: agents are treated as
risk-neutral individuals and agents' actions are assumed to be unobservable. Section 4
discusses the quadratic incentive scheme which will be followed by Conclusion in
Section 5.
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THE LINEAR INCENTIVE MODELS
The popular linear incentive models are the Soviet incentive model, Picard
model and Kirby et al. model. Basically, these three models are similar. The models
can be described as follows.
where, B' and Y' are the initial bonus and budget levels respectively; Y" is the
participatively-set budget; Y is the actual performance; and α, β and τ are the
reward/penalty coefficients.
These models have three stages Weitzman, 1976, p. 2531 First, the
preliminary stage, where the principal sets B' and Y' as the initial bonus and initial
budget levels, respectively, to meet the quota. The second or planning stage is
actually the participation stage, in which agent has a chance to determine a larger or a
smaller planned target Y", which correspondingly determines a larger or smaller
planned bonus B'+ β (Y"-Y')- By setting a higher planned target, Y", than the initial
budget level, Y', agents have an incentive to obtain an additional bonus b (Y"-Y'}-
The third stage, the implementation stage, is related to the actual bonus received for
actual performance Y. If actual performance (Y) greater (equal) to targeted
performance (Y"), actual bonus received will be greater (equal) than planned bonus.
If Y < Y", actual bonus received will be smaller than planned bonus, because of
penalty for unable to meet the quota. This penalty is necessary to discourage agents
from setting a reasonably high plan target in the budget setting stage.
The reward/penalty coefficients aie closely related. The extent to which agents
are willing to reveal their private information is determined by how the principals
determine the rewards/penalty. These coefficients should be determined in such a
way so that 0 < α < β < τ. That is, to induce agents to report their private information
truthfully, principals ought to determine the magnitude of the reward/penalty in this
order. First, when α < β, the agents would not get higher bonus by biasing Y"
downward and then having favorable performance. Second, when β < τ, the agent
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would not get higher bonus by biasing Y" upward and then having unfavorable
performance. Eventually, because α > 0, the agent has an incentive to have higher
performance.1
There is always an incentive to be truthful in a condition of certainty. But, for
an uncertain condition, it will be optimal for a risk-neutral agent to set Y" to
maximize the expected bonus if the following expression holds.

 )"YY(P (2)
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y
2
"
f(Y)dYis)"YY(P 3
1
 Technical  example of using this scheme and its related coefficients are described in Mann (1988)
3
 The numerical example is given in Waller (1988, p. 89).
The derivation of this expression is not detailly given in Wetizman (1976). The detail one is as follows.
Suppose that the probability density function of Y is f (Y) and  ~
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Differentiate with respect to Y” :
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     )/(-f(Y)dy)/(-f(Y)dy 
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     )/(-/)/(-f(Y)dy 
  )/(-f(Y)dy 
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A similar linear model with the Soviet incentive scheme was developed by
Picard [1987] based on Laffont and Tirole's work [19861 In his model, Picard
[1987] jointly employs moral hazard and adverse selection features. Moral hazard
results from hidden action4, while adverse selection exists because of hidden
information problem.
Suppost that ∞ is a cost parameter, a (∞) is level of output, Φ (a (∞)) is
disutility of effort, and t(∞,x) is the incentive. Principal’s outcome, x is a (∞) - ∞ + e,
where e is a random variable (0, σ2) with density function g(e). Let r(∞) = a(∞) - ∞,
Picard model for optimal incentive from principal view point then can be formulated
as follows.4
 


1
))(rx))((a('ds))s(a(')(a()x,(t
This scheme is similar with that of the Soviet incentive model, where Φ(a
(∞))+  ))s(a(' ds is a fixed initial bonus equal to )'Y"Y('B  , and Φ(a (∞)) (x-
r(∞)) is additional bonus equal to a(Y-Y”) or penalty equal to τ(Y”-Y) for those in the
Soviet incentice scheme.
A similar but clearer model is presented by Kirby et al. (1991) While other
models adopt an output maximization problem, Kirby's et al. model adopts a cost
4 We argue that his model actually does not include hidden action problem. I will discuss it in section
3.
The section of this model is as follows. Agent’s expected utility is his incentive minus disutility of
effort and can be written as :
  )(a(-deg(e))e)(a),(t)(u
Principal’s welfare is his outcome minus the incentive paid to his agent:    d)(fg(e)de)e)(a,(t)(aW
Substitute from agent’s utility for
  :))(a()u(g(e)de)e)(a,(t    d)(f))(a()(u)(aW
From the first-order and second-order incentive compatibility constraint, we get:
0)1u(for,ds))(a(')1(u)(u  
Substitute into W we get:     )df())(a(-ds))s(a')1(u)(a(W
Differentiate with respect to ∞ and solving for t(∞,x) yields model (3).
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minimization problem. Suppose EC is estimated cost reported by the agent, AC is the
actual cost, and v(EC) and w(EC) are positive value functions of expected cost, then
their incentive scheme can be written as: H(EC, AC) = v(EC) + w(EC) (EC-AC) (4)
Here again, this scheme is exactly the same as the Soviet incentive model, where
v(EC) is the initial bonus, w(EC) (EC - AC) is additional bonus/penalty depends on
favorability of the budget variance (EC - AC).
THE EXTENDED MODEL
As noted in the Introduction, the extended model incorporates the issues of
risk aversion and hidden action problems. The previous models assume that both the
principals and the agents are risk neutral. Because both principals and agents are risk-
neutral, their utilities are the same with their expected returns. This means that the
ordinal value of the agents' utility and the ordinal value of the principals' utility are
exacty the same. As a consequence, the principal welfare function can have the
agents' utility function as the functional argument (see footnote number 5 for this
discussion). However, if principals are risk-neutral and agents are riskaverse, the
agents' and the principals' ordinal values of the utility are not the same. In other
words, agents' utility cannot be substituted directly into principals' welfare function.
Accordingly, the previous models are not applicable in a situation where principals
are risk neutral but agents are risk-averse.
In addition, empirical evidence also demonstrates that risk preference is an
important factor in incentive scheme [Young 1985; Waller 1988] Risk-neutral agents
will response differently than risk-averse agents to incentive alternatives offered by
principal. This suggests that separate incentive schemes for risk-neutral agents and
risk-averse agents are needed.
The previous models address the unobservability of agents' actions (hidden
action problem) by measuring the agents' output. Picard [19871 for example, instead
of addressing the agents' actions, included the agents' level of output in his model.
This approach, however, creates an adverse selection problem. It is argued herein that
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to really incorporate hidden-action problem, the model should consider the worse
alternative action the agent will do if the incentive he would receive from the best
action is not persuasive. This contraint will be included in the extended model.
The Basic Framework
The extended model is developed based on Holmstrom [19791 Harris et al.
[19821, Picard (1987] and Varian's [1992] work. Following Varian's [1992], it is
assumed that there are n possible output levels (XI,..., Xn). Furthermore, given that
agents' actions cannot be observed directly, there is a probability that an action would
be taken. The probability of an agent to take the best action (b) to produce output
level Xi is Pib and the probability of the agent to take an alternative action a is Pia.5
Picard [1987] asserts that the principal welfare is output level minus costs of
producing these output minus incentives paid to the agent. Using this framework, the
principal welfare if the agent performs action (b) is:
As a risk-averse individual, the agent will maximize his von Neumann-
Morgenstern utility function of the incentive she or he will receive. Suppose the
agent's costs of action j is Cj. It is necessary to set a constraint to induce agent to take
the best action. However, the principal does not know this   best   action.
5 In Holmstorm’s (1979) model, the agent only produces two kind of outputs, X1 represents state of
world 1 as the bad state, and output X2 represents state of world 2 as produce X1 is P and the
probability of agent to produce X2 is (P-1), if I1 and I2 are the incentive for producing X1 and X2
respectively, so principal expected utility can be formulated as P x U(X1-I1) + (1-P) x U(X2 – I2).
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Accordingly,   what   the principal can do is to influence the action by giving
incentives at least as big as if the agent is   taking   another   alternative   action.   This
constraint  is  called self-selection condition [Harris et al. 1982]or incentive
compatibility constraint [Varian,   1992]   which   can   be written as follows.
Agents also have another option not to participate. That is, the agents may not
take either action (a) or (b). In other words, the agents may have another opportunity
(for example, they are working with another principal) that yields a certain
reservation of utility. Suppose, if agents do not participate, they will get utility U.
Hence, by participating, the agents have to have utility at least the same as U. To
enforce agents not to work with other principals, another constraint is needed. This
second constraint is called the individual rationality constraint (Harris et al. 1982) or
the participatory constraint (Varian 1992). It can be expressed as follows:
Pia/Pib is a likelihood ratio. It measures the
ratio of likelihood that agent chooses action a to
the action b. The greater the ratio, the
likelihood to the agent to choose action a.
The optimal result in equation (9)
suggests that incentive payment consists of
fixed bonus (n) and variable bonus (the part
after   the   plus   sign).   The   greater   the
probability of agent choosing the best action b,
the greater the variable bonus will be. The fixed
bonus   relates   to   the participation constraint
and the variable bonus relates to the incentive
compatibility constraint. This incentive scheme
is a linear function to the likelihood ratio.
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Observability of Action
It is argued in his paper that incentive compatibility constraint is necessary if
there is a hidden action problem (agents' action cannot be observed). This leads to the
proposition as follows.
Proposition 1, If agent's action can be observed by the principal, the incentive
compatibility constraint is inessential. Proof. Because agent's action now can be
observed, incentive payment will be a function of the action rather than the output
directly. The agent will get some certain incentive payment I(X(b)) or I(X(a)) for
performing action a or b respectively to produce output X. The incentive payment is
certain, so that in the constraints, probability Pia and Pib are not needed again as
follows.
U(I(X(b)) - Cb ≥ U(I(X(a)) - Ca
(incentive compatibility constraint)
U(I(X(b))-Cb ≥ U
(participation constraint)
Because the principal now knows that action b is the best, he can set up an incentive
that force agent to choose action b. This incentive can be U + Cb if agent chooses
action b, otherwise if agent chooses action other than   b.   This   is   clear   that
participation constraint is   binding     and incentive compatibility constraint is
inessential.  This incentive   system   is   called target  output scheme, a target output
X is set and agent will get incentive at his reservation price if he reaches this target,
otherwise he will get a punishment [Varian 1992].
Proposition 2.  When action is unobservable and the incentive compatibility
constraint is binding, any change that makes the agent better off will make the
principal worse off.Proof.
Differentiate equation (8) with respect to Pia we get:
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From the envelope theorem (δ? / δ Pia) means the effect of Pia against the optimal
value function. In this case, if the incentive compatibility constraint is binding ( λ > 0
), the change of probability alternate action is opposed to the principal optimal value.
Any change that makes the agent better off will make the principal worse off.
The degree of risk aversion varies from individual to individual. Varian (1992, p.454)
gives an equation as follows :
 (10)
If σ2 is equal to zero, it means there is no risk and T will be equal to 1. The greater the
risk or the greater the absolute risk aversion, the smaller the value of τ. The absolute
risk aversion is a measure of the degree of individual risk aversion. This value can be
measured using the Arrow-Pratt measure as (U"/U'), where U' and U" are the first and
the second derivative of the utility function.
THE QUADRATIC INCENTIVE SCHEMES
Picard [1987] shows that optimal incentive payment can always be
(approximately) formulated using quadratic incentive scheme. This scheme is robust
to error and the disturbance of random variable. The quadratic scheme for principal's
optimal strategy given by Picard [1987] is as follows. 6
Kirby et al. [1991] also demonstrate that if the separation of cost
environments (low cost and high cost environments) is not optimal, the linear
incentive scheme could fail and the optimal one is the quadratic scheme. They then
reformulated their model as follows.
6
 the derivation of this equation is provided by Picard (1987) in his appendix.
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CONCLUSION
Several types of incentive scheme have been discussed. These are grouped
into linear versus quadratic incentive schemes, agent's risk-neutral versus agent's risk-
averse incentive schemes, observable versus unobservable action incentive schemes.
Figure 1 below classifies the incentive scheme models into these categories.
The extended model is not intended to replace the other models. The extended
model is as a complement to the others. The choice of the model for specific situation
is important. One model is not always appropriate for every situation. The specific
model is contingent on the specific situation. This contingency approach is consistent
with the empirical evidence. Waller's [1988] study for example, concluded that an
erroneous assumption about the agent's risk preference may impair the benefit of the
scheme's information. This means that using an agent's risk-neutral scheme (such as
the Soviet incentive scheme) to a risk-averse agents is incorrect application. For risk-
averse agents, we must use an agent's risk-averse scheme in order to be effective in
applying optimal incentive system. Another example is outlined by Kirby et al. Il991]
in the choice of linear or quadratic scheme. They suggest that if the separation of cost
environments is optimal, linear scheme is not a wrong choice, otherwise the optimal
model is the quadratic scheme.
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